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Secure DHCPv6 Mechanism for DHCPv6 Security and Privacy
Protection
Lishan Li, Gang Ren, Ying Liu , and Jianping Wu
Abstract: With the rapid developmen of the Internet, the exhaustion of IPv4 address limited the development of the
Internet for years. IPv6, as the core technology of the next generation Internet, has since been rapidly deployed
around the world. As the widely deployed address configuration protocol, DHCPv6 is responsible for allocating
globally unique IPv6 addresses to clients, which is the basis for all the network services. However, the initial design
of the DHCPv6 protocol gave little consideration to the privacy and security issues, which has led to a proliferation
of privacy and security accidents breaches in its real deployment. In this paper, to fundamentally solve a range of
possible security and privacy issues, we propose a secure DHCPv6 mechanism, which adds authentication and
encryption mechanisms into the original DHCPv6 protocol. Compared with other proposed security mechanisms
for the DHCPv6, our method can achieve all-around protection for the DHCPv6 protocol with minimal change to the
current protocol, easier deployment, and low computing cost.
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Introduction

With the rapid development of the Internet, the Internet
Assigned Number Authority (IANA) exhausted all the
IPv4 addresses in Feb 2011[1] . Yet, the new Internet
technologies, such as IOT, bring with them a continuous
demand for the allocation of IP addresses. Compared
with the IPv4, IPv6[2] has a 128-bit address format that
overcomes the issues of IPv4, which greatly expands the
IP address space and which has been quickly deployed
around the world.
For all the terminal equipments, the basis of the
Internet connection is obtaining one globally unique
address for routing.
IPv6 address configuration
protocols, including StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC)[3] and Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)[4] , allocate
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globally unique IPv6 addresses to clients. DHCPv6
allows the DHCPv6 server to flexibly allocate IPv6
addresses and manage the address state information for
clients. Compared with the SLAAC protocol which
uses stateless mode, DHCPv6 uses stateful mode
that makes it easier to perform network management
functions, such as trouble shooting and access control.
In addition, even if a host obtains an IPv6 address
via SLAAC, the DHCPv6 is also used to obtain other
information relating to the local network infrastructure,
such as the DNS server address. Currently, DHCPv6 is
widely used and deployed throughout the real world.
However, in the initial design process of the DHCPv6,
no consideration was given to issues of security and
privacy, which has leaded to many challenges in the
current protocol.
With respect to security, clients are vulnerable to
attacks by the rogue DHCPv6 server, which may
lead to network connection failure over the wide area
controlled by the original DHCPv6 server. With respect
to privacy, the clear-text DHCPv6 messages exchange
process may disclose privacy information of the client,
such as their unique identity information. As the
basic routing information, the IPv6 address can be
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used to establish the relationship between the location
and network activity information. By monitoring the
address configuration process, the attacker can track
the location and network activities of specific users.
In London, the Renew company has implemented
the location tracking and recolonization of the device
operation system by collecting the unique identifier of
clients, such as the client’s DHCP Unique IDentifier
(DUID) in the DHCPv6 message[5, 6] .
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has for
some years focused on the security and privacy issues
of the DHCPv6. The Dynamic Host Configuration
(DHC) Working Group (WG) has issued many requests
for comments (RFCs) and drafts in an effort to
mitigate these issues[7–9] . However, those proposed
mechanisms have mainly focused on fixing discovered
security and privacy issues and do not fundamentally
address the generation of these issues mentioned. In
addition, the proposed secure mechanisms give little
consideration on the deployment issue, leading to
deployment difficulties in the current network. As
such, there is an urgent demand for the design of
a new secure mechanism that fundamentally solves
the existing security and privacy issues and is easily
deployed in the current network.
In this paper, we propose a secure DHCPv6
mechanism that fundamentally solves the security and
privacy issues in DHCPv6. In our proposed secure
DHCPv6 mechanism, we have added the authentication
and encryption mechanisms to the original DHCPv6
protocol. The authentication mechanism can protect the
DHCPv6 from active attacks, whereas the encryption
mechanism can be used to defend against passive
attacks.
Compared with other proposed secure
mechanisms, the secure DHCPv6 mechanism we
propose here can achieve all-around protection of the
DHCPv6 configuration process, with minimal change to
the original DHCPv6 protocol, easy deployment in the
real world, and low computing cost on the equipments.

2
2.1

Threat Model for DHCPv6
DHCPv6 protocol

The current DHCPv6 mechanism was standardized by
the RFC3315[4] , and then modified by 3315-bis[10] .
With the DHCPv6 mechanism, hosts are assigned IPv6
addresses and other configuration information relating
to the local network infrastructure, such as a DNS server
address, from the DHCPv6 server. The DHCPv6 server

is responsible for the assignment of unified addresses
and the management of lease information for all clients.
However, the current protocol provides no security
mechanism, and is therefor vulnerable to a range of
security and privacy attacks. In the following section,
we use the STRIDE threat model to analyze on the
existing security and privacy issues and the possible
attacks associated with the use of DHCPv6.
2.2

Security issues analysis

The goal of establishing a secure DHCPv6 is to ensure
that clients are routinely assigned a globally unique
and routable IPv6 address. In the message exchanges
between a client and server, the DHCPv6 faces the
following three types of attacks.
2.2.1

Rogue DHCPv6 server attack

Under the current DHCPv6 protocol, there is no
authentication mechanism for a rogue server check.
As showed in Fig. 1, attacker can forge as a
DHCPv6 server to achieve the wrong IPv6 address
and other information configuration on the host. The
incorrect configured IPv6 address will then lead to
network connection failure. The wrong DNS server
configuration can cause the DNS spoofing attack and
DNS resolution among other issues.
2.2.2

DHCPv6 message tampering attack

The current DHCPv6 mechanism provides no method
for checking message integrity, which may lead to a
man-in-the-middle attack, as illustrated in Fig. 2. If the
attacker modifies the DHCPv6 message content, then
the client will suffer the same attack result as it would
be in a rogue DHCPv6 server attack.
DHCPv6
server

Rogue
DHCPv6
server

DHCPv6
client
Request

Request
Rogue
conﬁguration
information

Fig. 1

Rogue DHCPv6 server attack.

DHCPv6
client
Request
Modiﬁed
conﬁguration
information
Fig. 2

DHCPv6
server

Attacker
Request

Conﬁguration
information

DHCPv6 message tampering attack.
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2.2.3

Denial-of-service attack for DHCPv6

Besides the lack of any server authentication method,
the DHCPv6 also lacks any client authentication
method. As illustrated in Fig. 3, numerous zombie
hosts may cause Distributed Denial-of-Serve (DDoS)
attacks on the DHCPv6 server. DDoS attacks result in
the huge waste of the server’s IPv6 address and CPU
resources, which may lead to DHCPv6 server crashes
and the failure to provide DHCPv6 service to all clients.
2.3

Privacy issues analysis

With respect to the privacy of the DHCPv6, here,
we focus on the provision of DHCPv6 client privacy
protection. As a public infrastructure, the privacy of
the server and relay agent is less important. The most
critical privacy information in the DHCPv6 message is
the host’s DUID information, which uniquely identifies
the specific host[8, 11] . The host’s DUID is computed
based on the stable MAC address, which makes the
host’s DUID stable and unique. However, currently,
DHCPv6 messages are transmitted in clear-text and
privacy information has no protection from passive
attacks, such as pervasive monitoring[12] . The client’s
DUID will disclose the host’s privacy information and
can result in the following attacks.
2.3.1

Network activity tracking

The IPv6 address can be used to correlate the host’s
network activities over the lifetime of the IPv6 address.
By monitoring the DHCPv6 configuration process, the
attacker can establish the relationship between the IPv6
address and the DUID of the specific host. In this
way, the attacker can determine the corresponding
relationship between the host’s DUID and network
activities. However, the exist ENCE of the stable DUID
prolongs the correlation period of network activities on
the order of years. Even if the host moves between
different networks and the IPv6 address changes, the
Zombie hosts
Rogue
DHCPv6
server

Attacker
Request

…
Fig. 3

Denial-of-service attack for DHCPv6.
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client’s DUID remains stable. Compared with other
privacy information, such as cookies and applicationlayer user names, the lifetime of the host’s DUID is
much longer.
2.3.2

Location tracking

Generally, as basic routing information for routing,
the IPv6 address indicates the topological location of
the host. By monitoring the DHCPv6 process, the
attacker can also establish the relationship between the
host’s DUID and location, which is similar to network
activities tracking.
2.3.3

Address scanning

When the client reconnects to a network, based on the
associated client DUID information, the server attempts
to assign the same IPv6 address as that assigned
when the client previously connected to this network.
Although this method is beneficial to client with stable
network connection, for the attacker, this situation
greatly reduces the search space and makes it easy to
scan for the specific host.
2.3.4

Device-specific property exploitation

The DUID is generated via the MAC address. Like the
MAC address, the host identifier may reveal the host’s
specific property information, such as the network
interface card vendor, operation system, and so on. In
addition, some information contained in the DHCPv6
options, such as Vendor Class option, also reveals
this type of privacy information. Attacker can utilize
the device’s specific property information to quickly
identify the specific weakness of a target.
2.4

Threat model of DHCPv6

Based on the above security and privacy analysis, here,
we use the STRIDE threat model to summarize the
DHCPv6 threat model as shown in Table 1.

3

Related Works

RFC3315[4] defines a DHCPv6 message authentication
mechanism for a message integrity check. This
authentication mechanism is based on the symmetric
key shared by the client and server. However, it
provides no any key distribution mechanism. For key
deployment, operators can set up a key database for
both servers and clients from which the client obtains
the same key prior to running the DHCPv6. However,
this manual key distribution conflicts with the goal of
minimizing the manual configuration for each host.
Consequently, this mechanism has never been deployed
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No.
1
2
3
4

Faced threat
Spoofing
Tempering
Denial of service
Information disclosure

Table 1 Threat model for DHCPv6.
Possible attacks
Rogue server attack
mitm attack
DDoS attack
Network activity tracking, location tracking
address scanning, device-specific vulnerability

in the real world despite it was proposed several years
ago.
Anonymity profile for DHCP clients, which were
standardized in RFC7844[9] , explains how to generate
randomized DUID information to minimize disclosure
of the privacy information. In the current DHCPv6
protocol, this stable identifier information is useful
for both the network administrator and host. For
the network administrator, knowledge of the host’s
identifier facilitates some network management
functions, such as trouble shooting and access control.
For the host, this identifier can be used to achieve
the same IPv6 address assignment when the network
connection is re-established. Randomized DUID
cannot perform the above functions, nor can they
protect other newly defined options that may contain
private information.
The privacy consideration for DHCPv6, which is
standardized in RFC7824[8] , presents an analysis of
privacy issues and the possible caused attacks in current
DHCPv6 protocol. However, no solutions are presented
in the document.

4

Secure DHCPv6 Mechanism Design

Based on the above threat model analysis, a secure
DHCPv6 mechanism must satisfy the following four
requirements: server authentication, message integrity
check, server availability, and information privacy
protection. In this paper, we propose a secure DHCPv6
mechanism, in which we add the authentication and
encryption mechanisms into the current DHCPv6
protocol. The authentication mechanism meets the
following three requirements: server authentication,
message integrity check, and server availability. The
encryption mechanism protects the privacy information
in DHCPv6 communication from passive attacks.
4.1

Secure DHCPv6 configuration process

Figure 4 details the message exchange procedure of
the secure DHCPv6 mechanism. Briefly, the secure
DHCPv6 mechanism requests the server’s certificate
information via an anonymous information-request

Fig. 4

Secure requirement
Server authentication
Message integrity check
Server availability
Confidentiality

Secure DHCPv6 configuration process.

exchange. Upon receiving the server’s reply, the client
checks the server’s identity information. Through
the above information-request and reply messages
exchange, the client achieves server authentication
while not revealing any private information.
The authentication process has three parts: certificate
check, signature check, and increasing-number
check. For the certificate check, it is assumed that
the client/server has been pre-configured a trusted
certificates list. In this way, a certificate is authenticated
if it finds a match in the trusted certificates list. The
signature is used for the DHCPv6 message integrity
check, and the increasing-number is used for the replay
attack defense. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below, we
explain in detail the methods used in the signature and
increasing-number checks.
Once the client chooses to communicate with the
selected server, it uses an Encrypted-Query message
to encapsulate its communications to the DHCP
server. Client authentication is established via the first
Encrypted-Query message from the client to the server.
As shown in Fig. 4, the first encrypted message is the
Solicit message, which includes the client’s identify
information, which is checked by the server according
to the above described methods.
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The Encrypted-Query message includes three
options, as shown in Fig. 5: Encrypted-Message
option, Server Identifier option, and Encrypted-KeyTag option. The Encrypted-Message option carries
the content of the encrypted DHCPv6 message using
the server’s public key. Via the Server Identifier
option, the server can determine whether it is the
target server, and thus paying no extra cost to decrypt
the message. The Encryption-Key-Tag option is
used to identify the public/private key pair used for
decryption when the server receives an EncryptedQuery message. The client and the server share a
common encryption-key-tag calculation algorithm. In
this way, the client and server can establish the same
corresponding relationship between the encryptionkey-tag and the public key. In Section 4.4, we explain
the encryption-key-tag algorithm in detail. After client
authentication, the server responds to the client with
an Encrypted-Response message, which contains only
the Encrypted-Message option. The format of the
Encrypted-Response message is the same as that in the
Encrypted-Query message. Using the client’s public
key, the Encrypted-Message option carries the content
of the encrypted DHCPv6 message.

So, we have added the following parameters for
timestamp check: the timestamp Delta for the time
difference between the client and server; the fuzz factor,
which compares the last and current timestamps; and
the clock drift parameter, which accounts for clocks
that are not strictly accurate. As the default values of
the above three parameters, we have allowed timestamp
delta value of 300 seconds (5 minutes), an allowed fuzz
factor of 1 second, and an allowed clock drift of 0.01
second.
To explain these rules more clearly, we developed the
following definitions: RCnew indicates the timestamp
contained in the received DHCPv6 message, and
LCnew indicates the local timestamp in the receiver.
RClast indicates the timestamp contained in the last
received and accepted DHCPv6 message. LClast
indicates the local timestamp when the last accepted
DHCPv6 message was received.
According to whether or not a timestamp is received
for the first time, the receiver will check the timestamp
using different rules. For the first case that the
timestamp is received for the first time, the received
timestamp passes the check if it meets the condition of
Eq. (1).
Delt a < .RC new LC new/ < CDelt a (1)

4.2

For another case in which the timestamp has been
received in the past, the received timestamp passes the
check if it meets the conditions of Eqs. (2) and (3):
RC new > RC last
(2)
LC new C f uzz >

Increasing-number check method

For the increasing-number check, the client/server
keeps a local record of the serial number and then
checks whether the receiving serial number being
received in the DHCPv6 message is higher than
the locally stored serial number. The timestamp is
one general choice for use in the increasing number
mechanism.
The timestamp mechanism is based on the
assumption that the client and server have roughly
synchronized clocks. In general, it is difficult to strictly
achieve time synchronization of the client and server.
msg-type

transaction-id

Server Identiﬁer

Encryption-Key-Tag

Encrypted-Message

Encrypted DHCPv6 message
Encrypted with client's
public key
Original DHCPv6 message

Fig. 5

Format of the Encrypted-Query message.

LC last C .RC new

RC last /  .1 drif t / f uzz
(3)
If the timestamp check is passed, the values of RC new
and LC new in the caches are replaced by the values of
RC last and LC new, respectively.
4.3

Signature check method

The client or the server can support various algorithms
simultaneously, which causes the challenge of how to
ensure that the same hash and signature algorithm are
used for the client and the server. The core technology
of the signature check is an algorithm negotiation
mechanism between the client and the server.
To realize this algorithm negotiation mechanism, the
hash and signature algorithms used must be identified in
the signature option. So, we added the Hash Algorithm
id (HA-id) and Signature Algorithm id (SA-id) fields
in the signature option, as shown in Fig. 6. During
the negotiation process, there is one case in which the
receiver does not support the identified algorithms of
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option_signature

option_len

SA-id

HA-id
Signature content

Fig. 6

Format of the signature option.

the sender. To solve this issue, we define mandatory
algorithms, such as SHA-256 as the hash mandatory
hash algorithms and RSA as the mandatory signature
algorithm. If the negotiation fails, then these two
peers can use the same mandatory hash and signature
algorithms for the signature generation and check.
4.4

Encryption-key-tag calculation method

Typically, the DHCPv6 server has multiple local
certificates, which correspond to multiple private/public
key pairs. The DHCPv6 server may communicate
simultaneously with different clients using different
public keys. So, the key technology requirement for the
server is the identification of the corresponding private
key for encryption when receiving an Encrypted-Query
message. To solve this problem, the client and server
share one common encryption-key-tag calculation
algorithm. In this way, the client and server can
establish the same corresponding relationship between
the encryption key tag and the public key. Algorithm
1 details the encryption-key-tag calculation algorithm.
The input of this algorithm is the data relating to the
public key, which is 32 bits or larger, and the output is
the 16-bit encryption key tag.

5
5.1

Secure DHCPv6 Deployment
Secure DHCPv6 deployment method

Prior to the DHCPv6 configuration process, the client
cannot connect to the Internet, which will cause
difficulties in the authentication process if using the
traditional certificate path validation method described
in RFC5280[13] . So, the key technology requirement
Algorithm 1 Encryption-Key-Tag Calculation Algorithm
Input: input parameters key, keysize
Output: output keytag
1: keytag = 0;
2: for i D 0I i < keysizeI C C i do
3:
keytag += (i &1/ ? keyŒi  : (key[i] << 8)
4:
5:

keytag += (keytag >> 16) & 0xFFFF
return keytag

for a secure DHCPv6 is to address deployment issues,
such as how to validate the received certificate offline.
The current authentication mechanism relies on the
operator’s manual operation, which restricts the wide
deployment of the secure DHCPv6. To realize a
wide deployment, we apply opportunistic security[14]
in the proposed secure DHCPv6, which allows
message encryption even if mutual authentication is not
available.
If secure DHCPv6 is deployed based on opportunistic
security, two main types of scenarios can occur.
The first is the enterprise network, where the stable
clients and servers are pre-configured the trusted server
certificate lists, so the DHCPv6 configuration process
is authenticated and encrypted. The other scenario
is the coffee shop, where roaming clients cannot be
pre-configured the trusted certificates lists[15] , so the
DHCPv6 configuration process is not authenticated
but encrypted. Although without an authentication
mechanism, these clients can not be protected from
the active attacks of a rogue server, the encryption
mechanism can protect clients from the disclosure of
privacy information, which is safer than the clear-text
configuration.
5.2

Secure DHCPv6 system design

The Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) DHCPv6
system[16] is an open source software for DHCPv6
client and server implementation, which is widely used
in the current enterprise grade DHCP implementation.
The proposed secure DHCPv6 mechanism is also
based on the ISC DHCP system[17] . Recently, the
ISC has developed an authentication mechanism and
will complete their development of an encryption
mechanism soon. For authentication, the following
functions have been added: timestamp check, signature
check, and public key check. Because the current
certificate contains only the public key information,
we have replaced the certificate check with a public
key check. To perform the above functions, we
have added a signature option, timestamp option, and
public key option in the DHCPv6 protocol. Via
the authentication mechanism, we can ensure that the
DHCPv6 server/client can not impersonate another.
A secure DHCPv6 client is realized based on the
Ubuntu 15.04 32 bits Virtual Machine with bridged
Ethernet (MAC address: 00:0c:29:40:3b:88). The
secure DHCPv6 server is realized on the iMac host
with 10.10.3 version OS. The secure DHCPv6 server
and client are all pre-configured with certificates and a
trusted certificates list for public key validation. In the
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IETF93 meeting, the DHC WG organized a hackathon
to test the proposed secure DHCPv6[18] . Based on
the result of the hackathon check, no problem was
identified in the proposed authentication mechanism.
Figure 7 shows the run results for the client side, and
Fig. 8 shows those for the server side.
5.3

Standardization in IETF

To date, the proposed secure DHCPv6[19] mechanism
has been submitted to the IETF DHC WG and been
approved as a WG draft. This draft mainly focuses
on a description of the messages exchange process.
Compared with the draft, this paper adds specific
implementation detail, including the timestamp check
algorithm, and adds the secure DHCPv6 prototype
implementation test to confirm its performance in the
real world.

6

Comparison with Other Mechanisms

As described in Section 3, the DHC WG has
proposed two secure mechanisms for the DHCPv6: a
message authentication mechanism in RFC3315 and an
anonymity profile mechanism in RFC7844. To evaluate
and compare all the proposed security mechanisms,
we consider the following four parameters: defense
capability, impact on the current protocol, deployment
difficulty, and cost. Table 2 shows our comparison of
these four aspects for the proposed security mechanisms

19

for the DHPCv6.
6.1

Defense capability

Based on the summarized threat model results in
Section 2.4, the design of the secure mechanisms for
the DHCPv6 must meet four requirements (see Table 1).
The message authentication mechanism can meet the
requirements 1, 2, 4, and anonymity profile mechanism
meets the requirement 3. Via the authentication and
encryption mechanism, the secure DHCPv6 mechanism
can meet all four requirements and fundamentally solve
the security and privacy issues of the DHCPv6.
6.2

Impact on the current protocol

The DHCPv6 protocol is currently widely used
in the Internet. As such, the design of the new
secure mechanism must minimize the changes
to the current DHCPv6 protocol. The proposed
message authentication mechanism simply adds an
authentication option for message integrity check.
The anonymity profile mechanism changes the
DUID generation method on the client side. For the
secure DHCPv6, the server authentication process
is added prior to the implementation of the standard
DHCPv6 configuration process. However, the server
authentication process is completed through the
traditional Information-request and Reply messages
exchange, without introducing any newly defined
message exchanges.

...
RCV: public key option (size 162)
RCV: signature option (size 130)
RCV: timestamp option (2015/06/04 23:11:08.858)
signature is valid.
public key is valid.
timestamp is valid.

Fig. 7

Implementation result on the client side.

...
SEDHCP6_OPTION_RECEIVED secure DHCPv6 option has been received: type signature
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: checking algorithms
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: creating RSA objects
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: comparing with config
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: handling timestamp
SEDHCP6_OPTION_RECEIVED secure DHCPv6 option has been received: type timestamp SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE
secure DHCPv6 processing: new client
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: checking signature
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: signature is valid
SEDHCP6_INCOMING_TRACE secure DHCPv6 processing: updating timestamps
SEDHCP6_TIMESTAMP_UPDATED timestamps have been updated

Fig. 8

Implementation result on the server side.
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Table 2

Comparison of the secure mechanisms for DHCPv6.

Article

Key technology

RFC7844

Randomized DUID generation
method on the client side
Message authentication based on
symmetric key
Authentication and encryption
based on asymmetric keys

RFC3315
Secure
DHCPv6

6.3

Defense
capability
3
1, 2, 4
1, 2, 3, 4

Deployment difficulty

The reason that the proposed secure mechanisms
have not yet been deployed in the real world is
due to the deployment difficulty. The deployment
of the message authentication mechanism is hard
because of the lack of a symmetric key distribution
mechanism. The anonymity profile relies on the MAC
address randomization mechanism, which is difficult
to be standardized and deployed. The proposed secure
DHCPv6 mechanism introduces opportunistic security
to facilitate wide deployment.
6.4

Computing cost

The anonymity profile introduces no computing cost to
the client/server. The introduction of the cryptography
technology will cause the computing cost on the client
and server. However, there are only a few DHCPv6
message exchanges, so the associated computing cost
on the client/server will be low.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

Currently, as the widely used address configuration
protocol, the DHCPv6 is the basis of all Internet
services for the host. However, the initial design of
the DHCPv6 does not adequately consider security and
privacy issues. In this paper, we propose a secure
DHCPv6 mechanism, which adds the authentication
and encryption mechanisms into the current DHCPv6
protocol. Through the authentication mechanism, the
client can be protected from active attacks, including
spoofing, tampering, and denial of service. The
encryption mechanism helps the client to defend against
the disclosure of privacy information. Compared
with other secure mechanisms for the DHCPv6, the
proposed secure DHCPv6 mechanism achieves allaround protection with the minimal change to the
current protocol, easier deployment, and low computing
cost.
However, some mechanisms, such as SAVI[20] , rely
on the monitoring of the DHCPv6 process[21] . The

Impact on the current protocol
Replace the before stable DUID
generation method
Add Authentication option
Add server authentication
before normal process

Deployment
difficulty
Hard
Hard

Computing
cost
No
extra
cost
Small cost

Easy

Small cost

encryption mechanism in the proposed secure DHCPv6
will impede the DHCPv6 monitoring procedure, which
makes them incompatible. The IETF has discussed this
problem, which may be the focus of future work[22] .
In addition, some new IPv6 address generation
schemes have been proposed[23] , such as NIDTAG[24] ,
which will change the DHCPv6 configuration process.
The proposed secure DHCPv6 can also be utilized to
achieve all-around protection for these newly proposed
mechanisms. The combination of the changed DHCPv6
configuration process and secure DHCPv6 may also be
addressed in future work.
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